confronting how racial and religious categories of identity and discrimination relate to one another. For a number of eminently practical reasons, cases involving overlapping claims of racial and religious discrimination or otherwise addressing the relationship between race and religion have been few and far between. The practical considerations that explain why so few cases have addressed the interrelationship between race and religion are well illustrated by Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila. In most cases where antidiscrimination suits are brought by members of groups that could be defined in either racial or religious terms, as in Dr. Al-Khazraji's lawsuit, the laws under which plaintiffs sue prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, religion or national origin. Because the civil rights statutes recognize all of these categories as creating 'suspect' or protected classes, there is no need to sort out which protected group a particular plaintiff falls into, or what kind of discrimination he or she endured. For the same reason, courts in these cases have had no cause to confront the question of whether 7 To clarify, there have been numerous decisions adjudicating 'racially ambiguous' parties' racial identities. Ariela Gross's What Blood Won't Tell (Harvard, Cambridge 2008 ) is the definitive treatment. But '[w] hile state courts frequently litigated individuals' racial identity, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely did,' Gross, 211, and few if any of these decisions addressed the role of religion in racial identity, or developed a general theory about the relationship between religion and race. 8 As a scholar of American law, I do not have the knowledge to comment on English or European law, so my remarks are confined to the law in the U.S., although Darian-Smith's book undertakes to provide a synthetic account of "Anglo-American law," comprising developments in England and Europe as well as America. 9 LEXIS and Westlaw searches reveal a paucity of opinions considering whether religious discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause or statutory laws against discrimination, and fewer cases still in which religion is compared or linked to race. Likewise very few cases litigated under the laws protecting religious freedom involve race in any explicit way. One notable exception is Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U. S. 574 (1983) in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the IRS's decision to withhold the tax-exempt status usually granted to religious institutions to a Christian university that imposed rules forbidding interracial dating. Even here, though, there was no analysis of how race and religion interrelate. certain people or groups fall into more than one identity category at the same time, as the proponents of theories of 'intersectional discrimination' and 'hybrid' identity would have it. 10 The questions that fascinate discrimination theorists, such as whether and how identity categories like race and religion intersect, and with what implications, simply do not arise in cases where multiple bases for discrimination are available, as courts see little point in trying to figure out which box, or set of boxes, the plaintiffs fall into, so long as it is clear that they fall into at least one.
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Similarly, courts have not had to confront the relationship between race and religion in cases like Shaare Tefila, not because more than one category is available, but rather, because the laws that govern these cases only recognize one type of discrimination, thus obviating the need (or opportunity) for choice. The only way for the plaintiff to go forward in Shaare Tefila is to satisfy the legal definition of race discrimination, because that is the only type of discrimination made illegal by the governing statute. 12 For this reason, the synagogue did not even advance a claim of religious discrimination, although outside the sphere of legal discourse, synagogue desecration is widely seen as an example of religious discrimination, par excellence. The concern in Wilder was not that non-Jewish children were excluded from the Jewish foster care agency, but rather, that they faced longer waiting lists to get in.
Likewise, non-Catholic children seeking access to the Catholic agencies faced a longer waiting list than children from Catholic families. Children who did not gain placement in either the Jewish or Catholic agencies were thrown back on the city-run, secular child welfare agency -widely perceived to be inferior to the Jewish and Catholic agencies in the quality of the services it offered, which was why the advocates for non-Jewish and non-Catholic children sought not to eliminate the city's reliance on religiously affiliated agencies, but rather, to gain access to them. This goal explains the obviously strategic nature of the definition of religion adopted in this case and its relationship to the category of race. Bernstein -issues about the construction of identity and how people are categorized and how our different classifications (race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, etc.) interact.
These are essentially sociological questions, concerning how society differentiates groups. While religious beliefs and history certainly affect the way a given society divides people into groups, the divisions drawn between groups are invariably shaped by other, sociological, factors as well, such as politics, economics, geography, ideology and culture. Indeed, a sociological perspective will often point up the extent to which religious beliefs are products of such factors rather than (or in addition to) the other way This view reflects the intuition that discrimination on the basis of race and religion differ in normatively significant ways.
It was just such an intuition that led to the carving out of an exception for 'pervasively religious' groups in the settlement agreement eventually reached in Wilder.
While the settlement replaced the traditional religious matching policies of the Catholic and Jewish agencies with a policy of first come/first served, it made an exception for children coming from families 'whose religious beliefs pervade and determine the entire mode of their lives,' allowing them to be placed in 'specially designated programs designed to accommodate their religious observances. 25 The immediate beneficiary of this exception was New York's community of Orthodox Jews. Indeed, it was in response 24 The debate over whether a right to accommodation is constitutionally compelled has spawned an extensive literature. need, or at least found it edifying, to turn to the actual history of relations between groups in order to flesh out the abstractions of moral philosophy and figure out when it is appropriate to satisfy the demand for a right to cultural self-preservation (and insulation), and when not. And this makes us more willing to entertain their claims to cultural rights even as we remain wary of extending them to less vulnerable groups.
It is tempting, in this context, to draw a simple dichotomy between minorities and majorities, on the assumption that it is always majorities who dominate and victimize minorities, and not the other way around. But history reminds us that such a simple distinction will not hold, as there are plenty of cases in which it is a minority that stands 
The Religious Origins of Minority Rights
Darian-Smith's book is very much in keeping with this historicizing impulse.
Although by training a cultural anthropologist, her approach here is wedded to the idea that we can illuminate the normative content of concepts such as 'race,' 'rights', and 'religious minority' (and show how these terms are related to one another) by tracing their origins and subsequent evolution. She is careful to explain that 'this book does not present a conventional legal history,' but, '[r]ather … a cultural study of law that explores the "conceptual conditions that make possible that practice we understand as the rule of law."' 30 That said, methodologically, it takes a historical approach, structured chronologically around a series of key stages, or turning points, in the development of modern legal conceptions of race, religion, and rights. Inevitably, as a result of its chronological reach (from the 16 th century to the present) and its ambitious aim (to synthesize all the most crucial developments), depth is sacrificed for breadth, and specialists in the diverse eras and areas covered by its broad swath will no doubt find much to quarrel with. But there is no disputing Darian-Smith's basic historical contention, which is that both our rights discourse and our race discourse have been influenced, if not completely shaped, by ideas about 'minorities' and 'rights' that migrated out of the religious context in which these ideas were originally formed.
Darian-Smith's book is at its best in recounting the religious origins of the concepts of 'minority' and 'minority rights' that have come to play such a large role in our legal and political life on both the national and international stage. It documents the centrality of the notion of minority rights to rights discourse generally, and further demonstrates the central role of religion in producing our notions of what minorities are and what rights they deserve. As Darian-Smith notes, theological reasons and arguments were put forward in favor of recognizing and protecting religious minorities as far back as the 16 th century. These early theological arguments for religious liberty and minority protection can be seen as precursors of the doctrines of human liberty and equality that gave rise to the political philosophy of modern liberalism. To be sure, not all of the 30 RRR at 3. premodern theological formulations regarding the freedom of religious minorities took the form of 'rights.' Some religiously grounded policies of religious tolerance were enunciated in terms of government charters and corporate privileges granting religious minorities forms of protection that bear little relation to modern liberal notions of rights.
Nonetheless, Darian-Smith is right to maintain that there were theological traditions that adumbrated modern ideas about granting religious groups or individuals 'rights' and, in so doing, supplied the intellectual origins of liberal principles of liberty and equality.
Principles of tolerance and freedom of dissent and belief that originated in the context of thinking about relations between competing religious groups eventually were extended to nonreligious beliefs and groups as well.
From Theology to Politics (or Vice Verse)
But it was not only in the realm of theological argument that religion brought about an appreciation for the rights of minorities. Religion played a role in producing the values of tolerance and individual and minority rights in more material ways as well.
Indeed, according to the standard history of religious tolerance, the material forces of religious history were primary, ideas, secondary. The standard story, recounted by Darian-Smith, is that religious tolerance emerged in the aftermath, and as a consequence, of Europe and England's violent and protracted religious wars. It was the historical experience of religious persecution, more than any theological doctrine, that brought about first a grudging acceptance, and then a more robust form of respect for the rights of religious dissenters, as sheer exhaustion after centuries of religious conflict led to a growing revulsion against bloodshed. Eventually, this recoil from religious conflict led to the piecemeal implementation of policies of religious tolerance, policies that were initially based on purely pragmatic considerations and only gradually evolved into more principled (philosophically and theologically grounded) positions about religious minorities' rights.
What Darian-Smith seeks to add to this familiar story is a sense of how emergent notions of religious tolerance and minority rights were enmeshed with evolving notions about the existence of different (and unequal) races and nations. She does so by turning back the clock to focus on religious conflicts that predated the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing conflicts between Catholics and Protestants (and between religious dissenters and the established church). As Darian-Smith reminds us, the formative contexts in which Western ideas about religious minorities first took shape were not the conflicts among competing sects of Christians that led to Europe's 'religious wars,' but rather, Europe's confrontation with the 'infidel Turk' and Christianity's still more ancient conflict with Judaism. Whereas the 'marauding Turks' were the foreign enemy, posing a constant threat of invasion, the 'Christ-killing' Jews constituted the enemy within. What made these internal and external enemies alike was not just that they were they both, definitively, non-Christian (and hence the target of ceaseless anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim religious polemics) but also that they both they occupied categories of an alien 'other' in which the religious, racial and national dimensions of identity were blurred. To the Christian crusaders who sought to reclaim the territories lost first to the Arab conquest and later to the 'marauding Turks,' the external enemy was defined as much by his Muslim as by his 'Oriental' identity. Indeed, the two dimensions were thoroughly in the European Racial Thought 31 The assertion that Turkey is not part of Europe is of course itself a deeply contested ideological position that reflects the larger contestation over national, racial and religious identity boundaries that Darian-Smith seeks to relate. usages. But, as Darian-Smith recognizes, none of the premodern usages bore the precise meanings that these terms would come to bear once the modern ideologies of racial pseudo-science and political nationalism came to prevail. And this is in part because one of the things that both modern nationalism and the modern science of race aimed to do was to bring a 'scientific' precision to concepts that was formerly lacking. Racial scientific theory purported to accomplish this by identifying the biological differences that distinguished the races, thereby making cultural differences and political boundaries secondary to ancestry and physiology. It thus separated out components of identity (biological race, political nationhood, religious and cultural practices and beliefs) that formerly were fused, elevating biology over these other bases for classification as the defining criterion of identity and social rank. Nationalism did its part by attempting to separate out ostensibly different ethnic groups into their own political entities. Thus, both physically, through various forms of political and social segregation, and conceptually, by positing and analyzing scientific concepts of race and ethnos, these two quintessentially modern 19 th century endeavours, political nationalism and scientific racism, crystallized racial and ethnic identities into distinct biological and cultural/political entities, and strove to maintain their analytic and social distinctiveness by any means possible.
From Europe to America
Of course, these efforts at physical and conceptual separation were doomed to fail. 'Scientific' racism was ultimately no more successful in purging cultural definitions of identity from the 'biological' categories of 'Caucasian,' 'Mongolian,' 'Semites,' and 'Negroid' than nationalism was in achieving religiously and ethnically homogeneous political units. Inevitably, every effort to 'cleanse' the putatively distinctive groups of racial impurities was defeated. Not, however, before much deadly work in the service of maintaining racial and national boundaries was done.
Darian-Smith's book touches on these complexities but does not fully do justice to them. And indeed, perhaps no single book could. Where she does perform a valuable service is in reminding us of the salience of the Jew and the Muslim/Turk in the racial imagination of the West. Whether real or imaginary, this cultural entity, 'the West,' was firmly ensconced in Europe at least until the 16 th century, and even after European colonialist ventures exported Western culture to Asia, Africa and the Americas, it retained its Eurocentric perspective. It was in America that transplanted Western culture would undergo its most profound transformations. But while the U.S. was destined to attain a position of cultural dominance that would reshape Western conceptions of race and religion (and just about everything else), it was, historically speaking, a latecomer to the Western experience and outlook. Ideas about race and religion that had originated in early European encounters with non-Christian 'others' would continue to exert a powerful hold on Western thought, even if that hold was more palpable in Europe than in America. Darian-Smith's book serves as an important reminder of this point.
What the book does not discuss is how the difference in perspectives between
Europe and America, and between Europeanists and Americanists, might account for much of the dichotomization between race and religion that Darian-Smith observes.
Indeed, a good deal of the 'blindness' that she ascribes to scholars is attributable to the differences -and, more importantly, the growing separation -between Europe and
America that developed as the colonies gained increasing independence. To
Europeanists, it will come as no surprise that the lawsuits that confounded the American categories of race, nation, and religion were brought respectively by a Muslim Arab (Dr.
Al-Khazraji) and a Jewish synagogue (Shaare Tefila Congregation.) While other groups also confound the categories, 36 it is surely no coincidence that the two groups which gained the courts' attention in making a bid for status as a legally protected 'racial group'
were the very same ones that historically loomed largest in the European imagination as racial and religious 'others.' the Holocaust and the Nazi racial laws, which took the racialist strand of European antiSemitism to its utmost limit, in addition to the long and tangled history of colonialism and decolonization that has led to the surge of Muslim immigrants and consequent wave of Islamophobia sweeping across Europe today -is that race will ultimately be defined negatively, by the beliefs that racists impose on those they victimize, rather than positively, in terms of the self-conception of the group, then it makes sense to conclude that Jews and Muslims are races protected under civil rights laws.
For Americans, by contrast, far from being paradigmatic, Jews, Arabs and
Muslims are 'hard cases' precisely because they are liminal and straddle the ostensibly separate categories of race, nation, and religion. The paradigmatic victim of racism in America is not the Jew or the Muslim, but rather, the African American. As in Europe, race takes its meaning in America from the country's history of racism and the particular institutions under which its history of racial subordination unfolded. That history of course begins with the history of slavery, and it continues with the legacy of slavery, from Jim Crow segregation and lynchings to the various forms of bigotry and institutional and structural racism that persist to this day. This is a history that makes the descendants of slaves the paradigmatic racial minority, and thereby makes race, in the sense of biological ancestry, the supposedly sole criterion of racial identity. Whereas the paradigmatic victims in Europe fuse elements of religion, nationality and ethnicity with race, the paradigmatic racial other in the United States is defined by race largely to the exclusion of other dimensions of identity, such as religion, nationality and culture.
This is not to deny that in practice the ascription of racial identity in America rests on all sorts of criteria other than 'blood.'
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Nor does it mean that cultural differences are not imputed to Blacks and Whites (and other recognized races.) There is indeed a long and sorry history of attributing cultural differences, in particular, a 'culture of poverty,' to Blacks, while ascribing superior cultural characteristics to Whites.
Occasionally, the tables are turned and minorities are attributed with positive cultural characteristics that the dominant racial group is said to lack. 38 Religion also is deemed to play an essential part in racial identity by promoting a sense of cohesion and a positive sense of group identity. None of this, however, makes religion or culture integral to the 37 See Gross (n 7). 38 The current debate over stereotypes attributed to Asians spawned by the controversy over " clear. But the other half the time, as when she discusses Paine, she seems to revert to the old secularization thesis, according to which secularism is associated with the forces of liberal progress, while religion is presented as a force of reaction which had to be shed before the rights of man could be vindicated.
Another problem with Darian-Smith's presentation of the critique of the secularization thesis is that it is not fully clear how these views about the relationship between secularism and religion connect with race and how they connect to law. The omission of race from the study of religion is no less glaring than the omission of religion from many analyses of race. The idea that the recent spate of critiques of the secularization thesis might shed light on the interrelationships between race and religion is tantalizing. In our post-9/11 world, the questions of how religion interacts with race and how discrimination on the basis of religion interacts with discrimination on the basis of race and nationality in cases like Dr. Al-Khazraji's would seem to be more urgent than ever. But while Darian-Smith makes the religious pedigree of liberal ideas of civil rights and human rights clear, and shows how that religious pedigree sometimes undermines those ideals, causing them to legitimate regimes of oppression rather than to liberate people from them, she never brings all of the threads of her vast topic -religion, race, rights -together.
Nor could any one book be expected to. Although attempting to add a historical analysis to the analysis of secularism 'enlarges the task, potentially without limit,' not undertaking a historical reconstruction of the evolution of secularism means that the true nature of our legal system and its connections to religion will remain hidden from sight. 
